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Abstract
The first Global Climate Strike on March 15, 2019 has represented a historical turn in
climate activism. We investigate the cross-section of European stock price reactions to
this event. Looking at a large sample of European firms, we find that the unanticipated
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developments of climate regulation.
JEL Classification: Q01, G14, G40, G23
Keywords: Climate risks, stock returns, event study, environmental preferences, sus-
tainable finance, investor attention
∗We particularly thank Alexander Wagner, Marie Brie`re, and Steven Ongena for useful suggestions.
Ramelli thanks the University of Zurich Research Priority Program “Financial market regulation” for finan-
cial support. Disclaimer: The content of this article does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the
European Commission. Responsibility for the information and views expressed therein lies entirely with the
authors. The authors declare that they have no relevant or material financial interests that relate to the
research described in this paper.
†University of Zurich, Department of Banking and Finance. Email: stefano.ramelli@bf.uzh.ch.
‡European Commission, Joint Research Centre. Email: elisa.ossola@ec.europa.eu.
§Universita´ Politecnica delle Marche. Email: m.rancan@univpm.it.
1
1 Introduction
As extreme weather events become more frequent and severe, the risks of climate change for
our societies become dramatically evident. In recent years, the demand for more far-reaching
actions at the international level to limit CO2 emissions sparked an unprecedented wave of
climate activism by young people. In this paper, we show that this new climate activism
affects investors’ behavior and the market values of high-polluting firms.
We investigate the cross-section of stock price reactions to the first ever Global Climate
Strike, held on March 15, 2019. Under the slogan “FridaysForFuture”, this coordinated wave
of climate protests by students mobilized more than 1.4 million people in over 2,000 cities
worldwide, receiving massive media coverage.1 We argue that the success of Global Climate
Strike, both in terms of participation and resonance, established a historical turning point in
environmental activism, causing a shift in the general expectations in the economy about the
environmental preferences of newest generations. In addition to its potential relevance for
financial markets, the first Global Climate Strike is particularly interesting for our empirical
purposes also because it was organized by, and addressed to, young people in the 14-19 age
group, who are unlikely to be active participants in the stock markets. Hence, it can be
considered quasi-exogenous to finance.2
Our analyses aim at testing whether investors reacted to the first Global Climate Strike
by penalizing high-carbon intensity firms. To do that, we investigate the CAPM-adjusted
cumulative abnormal returns from the day before the climate strike through three days
1According to data released on the official website of Fridays for Future: https://www.
fridaysforfuture.org/.
2For details on the demographic characteristics and motivations of strike participants across Europe, see
Wahlstro¨m et al. (2019).
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afterwards (the period of highest saliency of the event) on a broad sample of European stocks.
Our analyses are based on two complementary measures of corporate carbon intensity. First,
we consider data on carbon emissions from Eurostat available for 64 different sectors and 27
countries. Although these data provide information only at the sector-country level, they
allow us to analyze the effect of carbon emissions on the cross-section of returns for more
than 4,000 stocks.
The second measure of carbon intensity is based on firm-level data carbon data by Sus-
tainalytics. Sustainalytics is a major provider of ESG research, whose scores are often used
in academic finance research. This measure is available for around 1,500 European firms,
which allows us to analyze the relation between carbon intensity and stock prices at a more
granular level.
Our evidence indicates that around the timing of the first Global Climate Strike, firms
with higher carbon intensity experienced significantly negative abnormal returns. For in-
stance, when using the measure from Eurostat, a one standard deviation increase in carbon
intensity is associated with 25 basis points lower cumulative abnormal returns in the 5-day
window around the event. Similar results are obtained when using the carbon intensities
based on Sustainalytics data. These results are confirmed in alternative specifications and
robustness checks.
A central question is “Why did a wave of climate protests by student stir such an effects
on financial markets?”. A first possible channel is the update of investors’ beliefs about the
level of environmental preferences in the economy. More pronounced environmental pref-
erences imply higher future demand for “green” products, reducing the cash flows of more
polluting firms. Furthermore, as the movement explicitly call political leaders to increase
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the regulatory efforts on climate change, our results are also likely to be driven by investors’
anticipation of the future tightening of environmental regulation and deployment of new
legislative initiatives. A related interpretation is also that the climate strikes contributed to
renew investors’ attention to already-existing corporate risks related to climate change. We
provide suggestive evidence on a strategic explanation of investors’ behavior by exploiting
cross-country heterogeneities in terms of environmental social norms and environmental pol-
icy stringency. We find that the negative stock price reaction for more polluting companies is
more pronounced in countries with ex-ante lower levels of average environmental preferences
and lower levels of environmental policy stringency.
Finally, we conduct an out-of-sample panel regression exercise looking at the daily stock
returns through June 30, 2019. We exploit an interesting cross-country differential timing of
attention to the young climate activist Greta Thunberg, caused by her intense campaigning
activity and travelling across Europe. Our analysis shows that a higher daily attention to
climate activism is associated with a higher (negative) pricing of corporate carbon emissions
on financial markets, in line with our results on the effects of the first Global Climate Strike.
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. First, it contributes to the literature
studying investors’ behavior with respect to corporate climate externalities, and how this
behavior affect firm valuations. Chava (2014) and Matsumura, Prakash, and Vera-Mun˜oz
(2014) find that financial markets penalize firms with more negative environmental exter-
nalities.3 The firm-value price of carbon emissions, however, is also known to be influenced
3In a similar fashion, Tang and Zhang (2019) shows that following a green bond issuance (fixed income
securities issued for environmental or climate-related projects), stock prices of these issuers have a positive
reaction and domestic institutional investors, mainly investment advisers and pension funds, increase their
share of ownership. Similarly, Flammer (2018) finds a positive stock market reaction to green bond issuance
and an increase in holdings by long-term and environment-conscious investors.
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by various factors, including the saliency of extreme weather events (e.g., Choi, Gao, and
Jiang, 2019, Pankratz, Bauer, and Derwall, 2019) and the political uncertainty surrounding
environmental regulation (e.g., Ilhan, Sautner, and Vilkov, 2019 and Ramelli, Wagner, Zeck-
hauser, and Ziegler, 2019). Our paper contributes to this debate by providing novel evidence
that the markets’ pricing of carbon intensity reacts to environmental activism.
Second, we contribute to the literature on the effect of social norms in financial markets.
There is now extensive evidence that investors behavior is motivated also by non-pecuniary
motives, and that a large fraction of retail investors prefer socially responsible investments,
sometimes even irrespectively of risk and return considerations (e.g., Ceccarelli, Ramelli,
and Wagner, 2019, Barber, Morse, and Yasuda, 2019, Hartzmark and Sussman, 2019, Riedl
and Smeets, 2017). A growing number of institutional investors also integrate sustainability
considerations – particularly with respect to climate change – in their investment decisions
(e.g., Dyck, Lins, Roth, and Wagner, 2019, Krueger, Sautner, and Starks, 2019).4
However, the existence of this type of preferences does not necessarily imply an effect
on firm valuations and, more specifically, on stock prices. In fact, other investors in the
market may have symmetric tastes or sufficient ability to arbitrage-out any deviation of
stock prices from fundamentals (Fama and French, 2007). In order to impact firm valuations,
individual preferences need to become social norms,5 and influence the trading behavior of
4According to Global Sustainable Investment Alliance (2019), as of 2018, the assets managed according to
socially responsible criteria accounted for around 30 trillion USD globally. According to the NGO 350.org,
as of the same year, around 1,000 institutions with combined assets of around 8 trillion USD committed to
divest from fossil fuels.
5Social norms are known to be important drivers of human behavior in several economic and non-
economic settings. It should be stressed here that social norms are not just the mere collection of individual
preferences. Bicchieri (2005) argues that social norms are shaped by two main elements: the individual
expectations about how other people will behave (empirical expectations) and the individual expectations
about what other people think is the right thing that ought to be done (normative expectations). The social
nature of these expectations creates multiple equilibria, such that even small changes in the setting can lead
to large changes in aggregate behavior.
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marginal investors. Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) show that firms in the U.S. involved in the
production of alcohol, tobacco and gambling have higher expected returns than comparable
stocks, implying a higher cost of capital. They provide evidence of social norm effects on
investments for these stocks, which are identified as “sin” stocks. Have the stocks of energy
and other carbon-intensive firms become “climate sin stocks”? Bolton and Kacperczyk
(2019) and Hsu, Li, and Tsou (2019) provide initial evidence that high carbon emissions
are associated with higher expected returns, presumably because of their higher exposure
to environmental regulatory risk and their under-weighting by institutional investors. Our
paper contributes to this literature by showing that shifts in environmental social norms, at
least among the population, directly impact the market valuation of high-carbon companies.
Finally, our paper is also related to the broader literature relating firm environmental
performance to financing costs. Several studies indicate that companies with good envi-
ronmental performance, or better environmental risk management practices, enjoy a lower
cost of equity (Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, and Mishra, 2011; Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim,
2014; Sharfman and Fernando, 2008). On the debt market, Baker, Bergstresser, Serafeim,
and Wurgler (2018) indicate that municipal green bonds are issued at a premium compared
to ordinary bonds.6 Kleimeier and Viehs (2018) document that loan spreads are positively
related to borrowers’ carbon emissions, and that more favourable lending conditions are ac-
corded to borrowers voluntarily disclosing their emissions than to those non-disclosing them.
Delis, de Greiff, and Ongena (2019) find that after the Paris Climate Agreement, banks
started charging higher loan rates to firms with higher fossil fuel reserves. Our results warn
6However, the benefits of green bonds for corporate issuers is more ambiguous (see, e.g., Zerbib, 2019;
Karpf and Mandel, 2018).
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higher-polluting companies that their financing costs might further increase in the future as
a result of a further intensification of environmental activism in the economy.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces our main empirical strategy and
hypothesis. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5
discusses the potential channels of the main findings. Section 6 shows the results of the
panel regression exercise exploiting daily variations in attention to the “FridaysForFutures”
movement. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Empirical strategy
We assume that the excess return Ri,t of company i = 1, ..., n, at date t = 1, 2, ...T satisfies
the following linear factor model:
Ri,t = ai + b
′
ift + εi,t, (1)
where ai is the constant coefficient, ft is a vector of K observable factors, b
′
i is the vector
containing the corresponding k factor loadings and εi,t is the error term. To study the stock-
price reactions to the first Global Climate Strike, we compute abnormal return ARi,t as:
ARi,t = Ri,t − (aˆi + bˆ′ift), (2)
where aˆi and bˆi are estimated from OLS regression on Equation (1) using daily stock excess
returns data from January 2, 2018 through December 31, 2018. Defining abnormal returns
by adjusting for the Jensen’s alpha, allows us to focus directly on the effect of the event
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under study, net of the systematic under- or out-performance of specific stocks.
Our baseline model is the CAPM (Sharpe, 1964), i.e., the market model with K = 1 and
ft = rm,t, where rm,t is the excess return on the value-weighted market portfolio over the risk
free rate. Indeed, the advantages from employing multifactor models for event studies are
limited (see, e.g., Campbell et al., 1997). However, in Section 4.1, for comparison reasons, we
also collect results for the four-factor model (hereafter, labeled as 4F) proposed in Carhart
(1997), with ft = (rm,t, rsmb,t, rhml,t, rmom,t)
′, where rsmb,t and rhml,t are the returns on zero-
investment factor-mimicking portfolios for size and book-to-market, respectively, and rmom,t
is the momentum factor, i.e., the equal-weight average of the returns for the winner portfolios
minus the average of the returns for the loser portfolios (see Fama and French, 1993).
For our empirical purposes, the choice of the event window is of particular importance.
On the one hand, we need to balance the necessity to keep the event window as short as
possible to limit the concerns on potential confounding events; on the other hand, we need
an event window allowing enough time for markets to realize the success of the first Global
Climate Strike, and integrate into prices information outside the traditional realm of finance.
In order to define the event window, Figure 2 shows the daily global Search Value Index
(SVI) from Google Trends for the topic Greta Thunberg, the charismatic climate activist,
icon of the “FridaysForFuture” movement. As it can be seen, the attention to young climate
activism spikes around March 14, 2019 and remains at relative high levels up to March 20,
2019. Figure 2 provides valuable information for our empirical strategy. First, it suggests
that, although the date and goals of the first Global Climate Strike were known in advance,
its success in terms of participation and ex-post public attention was largely unanticipated,
hence supporting the relevance of the event under study. Second, Figure 2 suggests that an
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appropriate event window for our empirical analyses is from the day before the Global Cli-
mate Strike (Thursday, March 14, 2019) up to thee trading days after the strike (Wednesday,
March 20, 2019), i.e., the days of relative high public attention to Greta Thunberg.
Thus, we compute the cumulative abnormal returns over a 5-day window ranging from 1
day before through 3 days after the event ([-1,+3]), i.,e. CARi(t1, t2) =
t2∑
t=t1
ARi,t computed
between 14th March (t1) and 20th March (t2).
Figure 1. Google search index on Greta Thunberg.
This figure shows the daily global Google Trends Search Value Index (SVI) for the topic
“Greta Thunberg” from February 1, 2019 through April 30, 2019 (including non-trading
days). The index varies from 0 to 100 and represents search interest relative to the highest
point on the chart. The two vertical dashed lines indicate our chosen estimation windows of
5 trading days, ranging from Thursday, March 14 through the end of Wednesday, March 20,
2019.
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
D
ai
ly 
at
te
nt
io
n 
to
 G
re
ta
 T
hu
nb
er
g
01feb2019 11feb2019 21feb2019 03mar2019 13mar2019 23mar2019 02apr2019 12apr2019 22apr2019 30apr2019
To investigate how carbon intensity measure affects the cumulative abnormal return
computed for the specified event window, we study the following cross-sectional specification:
9
CARi(t1, t2) = α + βCIi +X
′
iγ + ei, (3)
where CIi is the carbon intensity measure, Xi is a vector of accounting variables (e.g.,
leverage, market capitalization, profitability).7
Our hypothesis is that the relationship between stock market reaction and carbon inten-
sity is negative. In other words, we expect companies with high carbon intensity – i.e., those
involved in more polluting economic activities – to significantly under-perform in reaction to
the Global Climate Strike. The null hypothesis is that investors do not consider the Global
Climate Strike as a significant event in terms of shift of environmental preferences and/or
anticipation of tighter regulation in the future and, hence, in our event window, do not price
firms differently based on their carbon emissions.
Looking only at one single event poses the challenge of controlling for the potential cross-
sectional correlation of returns. To account for potentially not-independently distributed
errors, we test the statistical significance of estimates aˆi and bˆi from Equation (1) using – in
addition to conventional t-statistics – adjusted t-statistics based on the empirical distribution
of coefficient estimates, following the approach in Cohn et al. (2016).8 All our findings hold
irrespectively of whether we assess statistical significance based on conventional or adjusted
t-statistics.9
7For easier notation, the measure of carbon intensity CIi is defined for each company i. However, in
Section 3.2, we also introduce carbon intensity measures defined at country-industry level. In that case, the
specification in Equation (3), becomes CARi(t1, t2) = α + βCIc,j + X
′
iγ + ei, where CIc,j is the carbon
intensity measure of country c and industry j in which the company i belongs.
8Specifically, we estimate Equation (1) over a short non-event period ranging from January 2, 2019
through February 28, 2019 (41 trading days). We then run the same cross-sectional regressions using the
event period returns. Finally, we compute the adjusted t-statistics by subtracting the average time-series
coefficients over the non-event period from the estimated event coefficients, and then dividing this difference
by the standard deviation of the time-series coefficients over the non-event period.
9In Section 4.1, we show that our results are highly statistically significant also using adjusted t-statistics.
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3 Data and summary statistics
In this section, we introduce the data involved in our empirical application. First, we provide
information on stock returns and accounting variables. Then, we present carbon intensity
data. Finally, we comment the descriptive statistics of our datasets.
3.1 Stock returns and accounting variables
We obtain daily stock prices from January 2, 2018 through June 30, 2019 for all listed firms
head-quartered in Europe (EU 28, Switzerland and Norway) from Compustat Security Daily.
Following Chaieb, Langlois, and Scaillet (2018), we keep only common shares (tpci =“0”)
listed on major stock exchanges.10 In cases of dual listings, we keep only the firm’s security
with the highest market capitalization, remaining with approximately 5,800 securities traded
as of March 14, 2019.
To compute stock returns, we closely follow the procedure outlined in Chaieb, Langlois,
and Scaillet (2018). We convert all prices in USD using the appropriate Compustat currency
conversion tables and daily conversion rates. We also adjust prices for dividends through
the daily multiplication factor and the price adjustment factors provided by Compustat.
We obtain data on European market, size, value, and momentum factors, in addition to
the risk-free asset, from Ken French’s website. The risk-free rate is the U.S. one month T-bill
rate. For each stock i, we estimate the vector of factor loadings bi in Equation (1), using
daily stock excess returns from January 2, 2018 through December 31, 2018 (estimation
period). Then, we compute abnormal returns ARi,t for the period from January 1, 2019 to
10The list of major exchanges is reported in Table A1. It includes the exchanges with the highest number
of equities per country, except for France (Paris and NYSE Euronext), Germany (Deutsche Boerse and
Xetra), and Switzerland (Zurich and Swiss Exchange) where two exchanges are selected.
11
June 30, 2019 as defined in Equation (2). To ensure that our estimates are not affected by
numerical instability, we compute abnormal returns only for stocks with at least 127 daily
observations available during the estimation period. As shown in Table A2 in the Appendix,
around 90% of firms have at least 230 daily observations.
In order to estimate Equation (3), we also collect standard accounting data from Compus-
tat Global, i.e., market value of equity, profitability (ROA), and market leverage. Accounting
data refers to fiscal year 2018, except for an approximately 10% of firms for which we use 2017
data as their fiscal year 2018 ended after March 15, 2019. We convert all accounting data in
USD using the Compustat currency conversion tables and 12-month average exchange rate.
Market capitalization is computed as the share price as of March 13, 2019 times the number
of shares outstanding on the same day.
3.2 Carbon intensity measures
We consider two measures of carbon intensity, one at the sector-country level and the other
at the firm level. These two measures offer complementary advantages. The first one allows
us to conduct cross-sectional analyses on a larger sample (virtually the entire market), while
the second one is suited to exploit the within-sector variation in climate performance.
At the country-industry level, data on carbon intensity are retrieved from Eurostat Air
emissions accounts (AEA).11 AEA are compiled at national level but follow the accounting
structures and principles of the System of Environmental-Economic Accounting, producing
internationally comparable and coherent statistics on the environment and its relationship
with the economy. Greenhouse gases (GHG) include CO2 plus other air pollutants expressed
11They are part of the European environmental economic accounts (Regulation (EU) No 691/2011).
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in CO2 equivalents. Data are published at annual frequency, broken down by country and
economic activity. The industry classification of economic activities is based on NACE Rev.
2 with details for 64 emitting industries.12 Based on Eurostat data, we define the variable
Carbon intensity (country-industry), computed as the ratio between total GHG and the firms’
value added (the unit of measure is kilotons of CO2 emissions equivalent per millions of USD).
As alternative measure, we also consider the carbon intensity from Eurostat defined as the
ratio between GHG and value of output. We use the data from the last available Eurostat
release before the Global Climate Strike, which refers to year 2017.
The second carbon intensity measure involved in our analysis is derived by firm-level
carbon data provided by Sustainalytics. Sustainalytics is a major ESG research provider
whose scores are often used in finance research, including, e.g., in Engle et al. (2019). We
define the variable Carbon intensity (firm) as a firm’s total Scope 1 and Scope 2 CO2 emission
equivalents in 2017 (the latest available information on corporate carbon emissions), divided
by its market capitalization as of the day before the first Global Climate Strike. Using
the market value of equity to normalize GHG emissions emphasizes the amount of a firm’s
negative climate externalities relative to its current overall value for shareholders (see, e.g.,
Hoffmann and Busch, 2008).13
12Since 1970 NACE, derived from the French Nomenclature statistique des Activite´s e´conomiques dans la
Communaute´ Europe´enne, is the official industry classification used in the European Union. NACE Rev. 2
is a revised classification adopted at the end of 2006. The 64 industries are the most granular level to which
the GHG data are available. Alternative datasets provide information at country level, without a breakdown
at industry level (e.g., Germanwatch, Worldbank).
13According to the GHG Protocol, there are three types of emission categories, Scope 1, 2 and 3. Scope
1 refers to all direct emissions from the activities of a company. Scope 2 considers indirect emissions are
created during the production flow. Scope 3 includes emissions that are a consequence of the operations of
a company, but are not under its direct control.
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3.3 Summary statistics
We merge the abnormal returns from Equation (3) and firm’s accounting information with the
carbon intensity data from Eurostat. We end up with a main sample of 4,108 stocks. Then, in
a similar way, we merge firms’ financial and accounting information with the emissions data
at the firm level obtained from Sustainalitycs. The corresponding main sample includes
1, 529 companies. Of these, 707 firms voluntary disclose their CO2 emissions. The CO2
emissions of the remaining non-reporting companies are estimated by Sustainalytics based
on firm-specific information.
Table 1 provides the distribution of the companies by country of domicile. About half of
the companies are domiciled in the United Kingdom, France and Germany. Table 2 shows
the distribution of the companies by the 11 Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS)
sectors.14 About half of the companies of the sample belongs in three sectors, i.e., industrial,
information technology and consumer discretionary.
Table 3 in Panel A and B reports descriptive statistics on stock returns of the Eurostat and
Sustainalytics samples, respectively. Focusing on the factor loadings, small stocks outperform
large stocks and value stocks outperform growth stocks during our sample period. Table
4 shows the summary statistics for the explanatory variables. In Panel A, the average
carbon intensity is around 0.32, but the distribution is highly skewed with a low number of
observations having very high values. A similar distribution is observed in Panel B.
In order to investigate the heterogeneity of Carbon intensity (country-industry), in Fig-
ures 5 and 6 we plot its distribution by countries and sectors, respectively. In the Panel A of
Figure 5, we observe a quite similar median of carbon intensity across countries. However,
14Henceforth, we consider the GICS industry classification because our reference data source is Compustat.
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we notice a different spreads of data. For example, the distribution of CIi in Finland is tight
due to the commitment of the country to reach carbon neutrality target by 2035. Looking at
Figure 6, the distribution of CIi for utilities, energy and materials sectors are shifted to the
right with respect to the distributions of the low-carbon intensity sectors. A similar pattern
can be also observed for the Sustainalytics sample.
Finally, in Figure 2 we show the average 5-days cumulative abnormal returns by GICS
sectors. As it can be seen, the average abnormal returns vary considerably between sectors.
In particular, in our event window, firms in the energy and material sectors appear to have
significantly underperformed the market.
Figure 2. Sector-level stock price reactions.
The figure shows the average 5-day CAPM-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns by 11
GICS sectors for the 4,108 firms in the Eurostat sample.
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15
4 Main results
In this section, we investigate the relationship between stock market reaction and carbon
intensity providing cross-sectional evidence based on Equation (3).
Table 5 refers to the Eurostat sample for which the carbon intensity measure is defined
at country-industry level. In specification 1, without any controls, the coefficient on carbon
intensity is negative and highly statistically significant. Including firm controls (specification
2), the coefficient of interest is even slightly larger. A one standard deviation increase in the
carbon intensity decreases the adjusted cumulative abnormal returns by a 25 basis points,
a bit higher than 5% of a standard deviation of the raw returns. Among the firm control
variables, only one coefficient on firms’ size is statistically significantly different from zero.
It should be noticed that this is coherent with the fact that we are analyzing abnormal
returns, net of a stock’s alpha and correlation with the market. Accounting information are
unlikely to influence abnormal returns, because they are already priced-in by the market.
Finally, in specification 3, we include also industry and country fixed effects. As expected,
the coefficient of interest is still negative but no more statistically significant. Indeed, as this
variable is defined at the country-sector level, adding country and sector FE absorb most of
its variation and, hence, significantly reduces the identification power of the regression.
Symmetrically, Table 6 provides analysis on the Sustainalytics sample. In all three speci-
fications, the coefficients on the firm-level carbon intensity is always negative and statistically
significantly. Focusing on specification 3, controlling for firm characteristics and sector fixed
effect, a one standard deviation increase in the carbon intensity decreases the adjusted cu-
mulative abnormal returns by a 0.40 basis points.
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To further support our results, Figure 3 shows the evolution of the estimated coefficients
on Carbon intensity (firm) from 10 days before the first Global Climate Strike (March 1,
2019) through 10 days after it (March 27, 2019). Most specifically, the coefficients are
obtained by regressing the CAPM-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns, from March 1,
2019 up to each day (controlling for sector and firm characteristics). As shown, up to the day
before our event of interest, the price of carbon intensity implied by market valuations is not
statistically different from zero. We observe a negative trend starting on day -3 – presumably
due to a natural anticipation of the event – suggesting that our results represent only a lower
bound of the market reactions to the first Global Climate Strike. The value penalty of carbon
intensity is statistical significant on the day before the event, and further increases on the
day after the event. Interestingly, the negative coefficient remains statistically significant
even after 10 days, without any apparent reversal in the short run.
Finally, Figure A1 in the Appendix displays the evolution of the estimated coefficients
on Carbon intensity (firm) using daily returns from January 2 through January 31, 2019.
Throughout this (pre-event) period, the coefficients on carbon intensity are always close
to zero and statistically insignificant. This placebo test confirms that the downward trend
observed in Figure 3 does not just reflect a pre-existing trend in the pricing of climate risks,
but is attributable to the effect of the first global climate strike.
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Figure 3. Global Climate Strike and stock-market carbon price.
The figure shows the evolution of the regression estimates of the effect of Carbon intensity
(firm) on CAPM-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns from 10 days before through 10
days after the Global Climate Strike on March 15, 2019, controlling for sector and firm
characteristics. The cumulation of returns starts on March 1, 2019 (day -10). The graph
also plots the 95% confidence intervals around estimates.
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Days from the first Global Climate Strike
Overall, the results presented in this section indicate that the success of the first Global
Climate Strike negative impacted the market valuation of high-carbon intensity firms, those
more exposed to climate change mitigation and adaptation risks.
4.1 Robustness checks
In this section, we provide several robustness checks to ensure the reliability of our main
results along four dimensions: i) the computation of t-statistics, ii) the definition of the
dependent variable, iii) the proxy for carbon intensity, and iv) excluding financial companies.
Results are presented in Tables 7, 8, 9, and 10, both for the Eurostat sample (Panels A) and
the Sustainalytics sample (Panels B).
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In Table 7, we present our baseline results by assessing statistical significance based on
adjusted t-statistics, as described in Section 2. For both samples and all specifications,
the results remain statistically significant as for the model estimated using conventional
t-statistics (for comparison, see Tables 5 and 6).
In Table 8, we estimate Equation (3) using the cumulative raw returns (CR) and the
Carhart-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (4F-CAR) as dependent variables. All pre-
vious results are confirmed, both when considering carbon intensity at the industry-country
level (Panel A) and at the firm level (Panel B).
In Table 9, we use alternative definition of carbon intensity. In particular, Panel A shows
the results when using the country-sector-specific carbon intensity from Eurostat defined as
GHG emissions over output value. In Panel B, we restrict the Sustainalytics sample to firms
that actually self-reported their CO2 emissions, to make sure our results are not driven by
Sustainalytics’s estimation methodology for non-reporting companies. The results of these
alternative specifications are in line with those presented in Tables 5 and 6.
Finally, as an additional check, in Table 10, we replicate our analysis excluding financial
firms from the sample (i.e., companies for which GICS equal to 40). Indeed, Scope 1 and
Scope 2 GHG emissions for financial firms offer only a rough approximation of their actual
exposure to climate policy risks, which mainly originate from their investment portfolios and
financial exposures. The results are in line with the previous evidence.
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5 Environmental social norms and policy stringency
This section investigates the potential channels driving the negative impact of the Global
Climate Strike to the stock prices of high-carbon intensity firms. We focus on two possible
factors: (i) the role of environmental social norms, and (ii) the level of stringency of climate
regulation.
To measure country-level climate-conscious preferences, we exploit the 2016-2017 survey
on public attitudes to climate change included in the Round 8 of the European Social Survey
(ESS), which was the first systematic comparison of public attitudes to energy and climate
change between European countries.15 We retrieve responded-level data on personal norms to
reduce climate change.16 We aggregate data at the country level by applying the appropriate
weights provided by ESS. We then split the sample between firms domiciled in countries in
the top tercile of environmental norms (i.e., Finland, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden,
and Switzerland), and firms head-quartered in other countries (i.e., Austria, Belgium, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, and the United Kingdom),
obtained two similarly-sized sub-samples.
To proxy for cross-country differences in the level of climate policy stringency, we exploit
the OECD Environmental Policy Stringency Index (EPS) developed by Botta and Koz´luk
(2014). The OECD Environmental Policy Stringency Index (EPS) is a country-specific and
15Fieldwork for the ESS Round 8 took place between August 2016 and December 2017. The full dataset
consists of 44,387 respondents from 23 countries. For an overview of the survey results on the topic of climate
change see ESS (2018).
16The variable that we exploit is ccrdprs. This indicator is based on the response to the question “To
what extent do you feel a personal responsibility to try to reduce climate change?” from 0 (not at all) to 10
(a great deal). According the ESS, this variable captures the extent to which an individual feels personally
responsible to contribute to the solution of environmental problems. Personal norms require a certain level of
awareness about the existence of a problem (climate change) and the feeling of moral obligation to contribute
to solve it. For more methodological details, see ESS (2016).
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internationally-comparable measure of the stringency of environmental policy. Stringency
is defined as the degree to which environmental policies put an explicit or implicit price
on polluting or environmentally harmful behavior. The index ranges from 0 (not stringent)
to 6 (highest degree of stringency), and covers 28 OECD and 6 BRIICS countries for the
period 1990-2012. The index is based on the degree of stringency of 14 environmental policy
instruments, primarily related to climate and air pollution. We use the EPS score to split
the sample between firms domiciled in countries in the top tercile of environmental policy
stringency (i.e., Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom), and firms domiciled in other countries.
Table 11 reports the standardized scores (mean zero and unit standard deviation) on
the two dimensions – environmental social norms and environmental policy stringency – by
countries covered by our analyses.17
Table 12 presents the results of cross-sectional regression in Equation (3) exploiting the
two ex-ante country-level dimensions across countries. Panel A reports the results for the sub-
sample of firms located in countries with low level of environmental social norms (specification
1) and the sub-sample of firms in countries with high level of environmental social norms
(specification 2). Although the coefficients on carbon intensity in the two sub-samples are
not statistically different from each others, the results indicate that the effect of the Global
Climate Strike on high carbon-intensity firms is more precise in countries having lower, rather
than higher, ex-ante environmental social norms.
In Panel B, we report the results of our main regressions by splitting the sample in
17The two dimensions have a correlation of 0.45, statistically significant at 1% level. Indeed, environ-
mental social norms shape environmental regulation through the democratic process. At the same time,
environmental regulation may in turn contribute to shape environmental social norms through the expres-
sive function of law (Sunstein, 1996).
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firms located in countries with low (specification 1) and high levels of environmental policy
stringency (specification 2). Also in this case, the coefficients on carbon intensity in the two
specifications are not statistically different from each others, but the market penalization for
high-polluting firms appears statistically significant only for the sub-sample of firms located
in countries where the ex-ante environmental regulation is considered less advanced.
Although the analyses in this section do not allow to draw any definitive conclusions
about the drivers of investors’ behavior, they provide suggestive evidence that the market
penalty on high-carbon firms around the timing of the first Global Climate Strike can not
be entirely explained by ex-ante environmental preferences or existing regulation. Indeed,
these results suggest that the impact of the Global Climate Strike is stronger precisely
in countries with relatively laxer ex-ante environmental regulation, where firms will need
higher efforts to comply with future tightening of climate adaptation and mitigation policies.
For instance, companies operating in the same sector but in different countries, may face
major costs in the long-period to comply with new European-wide regulation, for instance
the technical screening criteria identified in the EU Taxonomy for sustainable activities.18
Similarly, investors might foreseen that adaptation strategies could be more financially costly
in countries with weaker environmental social norms.
6 The Greta Thunberg effect
In this section, we explore the stock market effects of daily variations in attention to climate
activism from the first Global Climate Strike through the end of June 2019.
18See the report by the Technical Expert Group on Sustainable Finance introducing the EU Taxonomy.
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One of the peculiarities of the “FridaysForFuture” movement is to have a clear icon, the
young activist Greta Thunberg. After the success of the Global Climate Strike on March 15,
Greta Thunberg started an intensive travelling across Europe to lead various climate protests
and met politician in several countries. In particular, on April 6, 2019, she gave a speech
at the European parliament in Strasbourg; on April 17-19, she visited Rome, meeting the
Pope and addressing the Italian parliament; on April 21-23, she was in London, joining the
Extinction Rebellion protest and giving a speech at the UK parliament; on May 28, she was
in Vienna giving a speech at the Austrian World Summit.19 Greta Thunberg’s international
agenda caused an interesting heterogeneity in the level of attention to young climate activism
across European countries.
Figure 6 shows the daily Google search activity to the topic “Greta Thunberg” from
March 1 to June 30, 2019 for six European countries officially visited by the young activist
in the same period.20 Interestingly, the country-specific measures of daily attention spike
exactly when the young activist is visiting the country, reflecting a higher increase in media
coverage and general interest.
19See, e.g., The Guardian, “Greta Thunberg’s train journey through Europe highlights no-fly movement”,
April 26, 2019.
20For an application of Google SVIs in a multi-country setting see Choi, Gao, and Jiang (2019).
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Figure 4. Country-specific attention to Greta Thunberg.
The figure shows the daily country-specific Google Trends Search Value Index (SVI) for the
topic “Greta Thunberg” from March 1, 2019 to June 30, 2019 (including non-trading days)
for Italy, France, the United Kindgdom, Germany, Austria and Sweden. For each country,
the index varies from 0 to 100 and represents search interest relative to the highest point on
the chart.
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To investigate the relationship between market returns and the attention on Greta Thun-
berg, we estimate the following model for daily abnormal returns ARi,t computed from March
20 (the first trading day outside our main event window) through June 30, 2019:
ARi,t = α + β1CIi × SV IGretac,t + β2CIi + β3SV IGretac,t +X ′iγ + i,t, (4)
where SV IGretac,t is the Google search value index (SVI) for the topics “Greta Thunberg”
defined for each country c at date t. β1 is the parameter measuring the interaction between
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carbon intensity level and the attention for Greta Thunberg.21
The results are reported in Table 13. The regressions also include country, sector, and
day fixed effects. Looking at specification 1, the estimated interaction term of interest
is negative and highly statistically significant. A peak of attention to “Greta Thunberg”
(SV IGreta = 100) is associated with a 10 basis points under-performance per additional
unit of carbon intensity (ktCOeq per millions USD of market value), which corresponds to
around one half of the effect we estimated looking at the 5-day abnormal returns around the
first Global Climate Strike. Even more economically significant results are obtained when
using a measure of attention at the global level (specification 2), instead of a country-specific
one, presumably because of the trading activities of investors on international markets.
Overall, these findings suggest that a higher level of attention to young climate activism
is associated with a stronger penalization of carbon intensity on financial markets.
7 Conclusion
In recent years, the increasing concerns for the future effects of global warming have given
rise to an unprecedented wave of environmental activism by young people.
In this paper, we study whether and how this call for bolder climate actions is influencing
financial markets. By analyzing the stock prices of a large sample of European firms around
the occurrence of the first Global Climate Strike in March 2019, we provide evidence of a
loss in value of stocks of firms operating in high-polluting activities. The effect is likely
21Our approach of exploiting the international mobility of Greta Thunberg shares the same spirit of Lin
et al. (2019), showing that when the the Dalai Lama visit non-Chinese countries are followed by a reduction
in the host country’s trade with China in following quarters. We thank Steven Ongena for having pointed
this paper to us.
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resulting from an update of investors’ expectations about the environmental preferences in
the economy and the future tightening of climate regulation.22
Our results are relevant for corporates, investors, and policy-makers. First, high-carbon
intensity firms should anticipate that, as the degree of climate activism intensifies, their
cost of capital is likely to increase further (see, e.g., in Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner, 2001).
Second, our results warn investors of the fact that the timing in the “stranding” of high-
polluting assets is marked not only by the passing of new regulations, but also by perhaps
more unpredictable shifts in environmental norms in the population. Not surprisingly, on
July 2, 2019, the secretary general of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC) declared that the growing mass mobilisation against high-polluting sectors is
“perhaps the greatest threat” to the fossil fuel industry.23
Finally, our paper is also interesting in the context of current regulatory initiatives and
future legislation aimed at stimulating businesses and investors to account for climate risks.
For instance, the European Commission is setting in place a number of measures to making
financial flows more consistent with a low-carbon economy, including the development of a
EU-wide classification system (Taxonomy) for sustainable economic activities. Our results
suggest that the upcoming climate-policy actions are likely to have significant stock market
effects.
22Indeed, already in December 2019, the European Commission set out a European Green Deal for the
EU28 countries to cut emissions by 50-55 percent against 1990 levels by 2030, strengthening the previous
target mandates, and to reach net-zero emissions by 2050.
23See The Guardian, “Biggest compliment yet: Greta Thunberg welcomes oil chief’s ’greatest threat’
label”, July 6, 2019.
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Tables
Table 1. Distribution of companies by country.
The table provides the percentage of the number of stocks for each country for the Eurostat
sample (4, 108 stocks) and the Sustainalytics sample (1, 529 stocks).
Country Country ISO code Eurostat sample Sustainalytics sample
United Kingdom GB 23.32% 20.99%
France FR 12.03% 10.27%
Germany DE 10.81% 10.20%
Poland PL 9.52% 2.75%
Sweden SE 9.47% 16.22%
Italy IT 5.40% 5.82%
Switzerland CH 3.85% 6.67%
Spain ES 3.53% 4.12%
Greece GR 3.51% 1.57%
Finland FI 3.07% 2.42%
Denmark DK 2.73% 2.81%
Norway NO 2.73% 4.45%
Netherlands NL 2.24% 3.53%
Belgium BE 2.17% 3.01%
Austria AT 1.02% 1.77%
Romania RO 0.83% –
Ireland IE 0.80% 1.05%
Portugal PT 0.73% 0.85%
Hungary HU 0.49% 0.26%
Bulgaria BG 0.39% –
Lithuania LT 0.34% –
Estonia EE 0.32% –
Cyprus CY 0.24% –
Czech Republic CZ 0.17% 0.33%
Slovenia SI 0.17% –
Latvia LV 0.12% –
Slovakia SK 0.02% –
Luxembourg LU – 0.85 %
Total 100% 100%
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Table 2. Distribution of stocks by GICS sectors.
The table provides the percentage of the number of stocks for each GICS sector for the
Eurostat sample (4, 108 stocks) and the Sustainalytics sample (1, 529 stocks).
GICS Eurostat sample Sustainalytics sample
Industrials 21.03% 23.11%
Information Technology 14.00% 8.83%
Consumer Discretionary 13.02% 14.52%
Health Care 9.88% 9.22%
Telecommunication Services 7.52% 5.69%
Materials 7.47% 7.52%
Financials 7.45% 10.73%
Real Estate 6.96% 6.87%
Consumer Staples 5.40% 5.89%
Energy 4.43% 3.86%
Utilities 2.82% 3.73%
Total 100% 100%
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Table 5. Main results – Eurostat sample.
The table reports estimation results of Equation (3) of the 5-day cumulative abnormal returns
on the carbon intensity measure at industry-country level from Eurostat. Carbon intensity is
computed as the kilotons of CO2 emission equivalents per gross value added in USD millions
at the industry-country level. Specifications 2 and 3 also controls for basic firm characteristics
(log market cap, leverage, and profitability). Specification 3 includes industry and country
fixed effects. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **,
and * indicate that the parameter estimate is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: 5-day CAR 5-day CAR 5-day CAR
Carbon intensity (country-industry) -0.271*** -0.280*** -0.138
(-3.035) (-3.131) (-1.187)
Log market cap 0.117** 0.128**
(2.123) (2.371)
Leverage 0.698 0.408
(0.982) (0.515)
Profitability -0.002 -0.004
(-0.237) (-0.420)
Constant -0.010 -2.417** -2.616**
Observations 4,603 4,108 4,107
R-squared 0.001 0.003 0.020
Sector FE No No Yes
Country FE No No Yes
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Table 6. Main results – Sustainalytics sample.
The table reports estimation results of Equation (3) of 5-day CAPM-adjusted cumulative
returns on the firm-level carbon intensity measure from Sustainalytics, defined as kt of CO2
emission equivalents divided by the market value of equity in millions USD. Specifications 2
and 3 also controls for basic firm characteristics (log market cap, leverage, and profitability).
Specification 3 includes industry and country fixed effects. t-statistics based on robust stan-
dard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that the parameter estimate
is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: 5-day CAR 5-day CAR 5-day CAR
Carbon intensity (firm) -0.232*** -0.238*** -0.203***
(-4.866) (-4.870) (-3.059)
Log market cap 0.046 0.009
(0.524) (0.083)
Leverage 0.366 0.272
(0.546) (0.366)
Profitability -0.003 -0.003
(-0.229) (-0.229)
Constant 0.476*** -0.558 0.730
(4.710) (-0.293) (0.294)
Observations 1,629 1,529 1,529
R-squared 0.009 0.011 0.055
Sector FE No No Yes
Country FE No No Yes
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Table 7. Robustness I: Adjusted t-statistics.
The table reports estimation results of Equation (3) of the 5-day CAPM-adjusted cumulative
returns on carbon intensity measures. Panel A and B refer to the Eurostat and Sustainalytics
samples, respectively. Specifications 2 and 3 also controls for basic firm characteristics (log
market cap, leverage, and profitability). Specification 3 includes industry and country fixed
effects. t-statistics in brackets are adjusted for the empirical distribution of coefficients in
a pre-event period from Jan 2 through Feb 28, 2019, following the approach in Cohn et al.
(2016). ***, **, and * indicate that the parameter estimate is significantly different from
zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Eurostat sample
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: 5-day CAR 5-day CAR 5-day CAR
Carbon intensity (country-industry) -0.271*** -0.280*** -0.138
(-3.531) (-4.872) (-1.312)
Observations 4,603 4,108 4,107
R-squared 0.001 0.003 0.020
Panel B: Sustainalytics sample
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: 5-day CAR 5-day CAR 5-day CAR
Carbon intensity (firm) -0.243*** -0.260*** -0.232**
(-2.892) (-3.081) (-2.408)
Observations 1,629 1,529 1,529
R-squared 0.010 0.013 0.048
Firm controls No Yes Yes
Sector FE No No Yes
Country FE No No Yes
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Table 8. Robustness II: Alternative returns as dependent variable.
The table reports estimation results of Equation (3) of the 5-day raw returns (CR) and of the
5-day Cahart-adjusted cumulative returns (4F-CAR) on carbon intensity measures. Panel A
and B refer to the Eurostat and Sustainalytics samples, respectively. Specifications 2 and 3
also controls for basic firm characteristics (log market cap, leverage, and profitability). Spec-
ification 3 includes industry and country fixed effects. t-statistics based on robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that the parameter estimate is
significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Eurostat sample
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: 5-day CR 5-day CR 5-day CR
Carbon intensity (country-industry) -0.224*** -0.271*** -0.201*
(-2.858) (-3.524) (-1.881)
Observations 4,603 4,108 4,107
R-squared 0.001 0.009 0.029
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: 5-day 4F-CAR 5-day 4F-CAR 5-day 4F-CAR
Carbon intensity (country-industry) -0.354*** -0.369*** -0.162
(-3.009) (-2.962) (-1.288)
Observations 4,603 4,108 4,107
R-squared 0.001 0.003 0.019
Panel B: Sustainalytics sample
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: 5-day CR 5-day CR 5-day CR
Carbon intensity (firm) -0.233*** -0.225*** -0.186***
(-4.683) (-4.507) (-2.798)
Observations 1,633 1,533 1,533
R-squared 0.009 0.014 0.056
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: 5-day 4F-CAR 5-day 4F-CAR 5-day 4F-CAR
Carbon intensity (firm) -0.243*** -0.260*** -0.232***
(-4.973) (-5.109) (-3.445)
Observations 1,629 1,529 1,529
R-squared 0.010 0.013 0.048
Firm controls No Yes Yes
Sector FE No No Yes
Country FE No No Yes
Table 9. Robustness III: Alternative carbon intensity definitions.
The table reports estimation results of Equation (3) of 5-day cumulative abnormal returns.
Specifications 2 and 3 control for 2018 firm accounting data (market leverage, log market
cap, and profitability). Specification 3 includes industry and country fixed effects. In Panel
A, carbon intensity is obtained from Eurostat and is computed as CO2 emission equivalents
in kilotons of output in million USD at the industry-country level. In Panel B, we replicate
our main regressions with the Sustainalytics sample, using only the sub-sample of reporting
firms. ***, **, and * indicate that the parameter estimate is significantly different from zero
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are
shown in parentheses.
Panel A: Carbon intensity from Eurostat, normalized by output
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: 5-day CAR 5-day CAR 5-day CAR
Carbon intensity (country-industry, output) -0.916*** -0.948*** -0.413
(-2.681) (-2.740) (-0.955)
Observations 4,603 4,108 4,107
R-squared 0.001 0.003 0.020
Panel B: Carbon intensity from Sustainalytics, reporting firms
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: 5-day CAR 5-day CAR 5-day CAR
Carbon intensity (firm) -0.339*** -0.320*** -0.275***
(-7.850) (-7.476) (-4.901)
Observations 747 707 707
R-squared 0.035 0.043 0.105
Firm controls No Yes Yes
Sector FE No No Yes
Country FE No No Yes
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Table 10. Robustness IV: Excluding financial firms.
The table reports estimation results of Equation (3) of 5-day cumulative abnormal returns,
excluding financial firms. Regressions in Panel A use the sample and carbon intensity mea-
sure from Eurostat, while regressions in Panel B use the sample and carbon intensity measure
from Sustainalytics. Specifications 2 and 3 control for basic firm characteristics (leverage,
size, and profitability). Specification 3 includes industry and country fixed effects. t-statistics
based on robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that the
parameter estimate is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respec-
tively.
Panel A: Eurostat sample
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: 5-day CAR 5-day CAR 5-day CAR
Carbon intensity (country-industry) -0.250*** -0.280*** -0.143
(-2.768) (-3.095) (-1.206)
Observations 4,057 3,802 3,801
R-squared 0.001 0.003 0.020
Panel B: Sustainalytics sample
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: 5-day CAR 5-day CAR 5-day CAR
Carbon intensity (firm) -0.223*** -0.218*** -0.179***
(-4.598) (-4.495) (-2.997)
Observations 1,409 1,365 1,365
R-squared 0.010 0.013 0.050
Firm controls No Yes Yes
Sector FE No No Yes
Country FE No No Yes
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Table 11. Environmental social norms and policy stringency by country.
This table shows the average environmental social norms and environmental policy stringency
for countries included in our analyses and for which the scores are available. We standardized
both measures to have mean zero and unit standard deviation.
Country Environmental Environmental
social norms policy stringency
(z-score) (z-score)
AT 0.213 0.004
BE 0.120 -0.791
CH 1.147 0.578
CZ -2.740 -0.930
DE 0.867 0.315
DK . 1.505
ES 0.146 -1.206
FI 0.769 0.806
FR 1.199 1.062
GB 0.163 1.477
GR . -1.345
HU -1.766 -0.515
IE -0.052 -1.483
IT -0.641 0.564
NL -0.038 1.131
NO 0.415 0.523
PT -0.341 -0.612
PR -0.133 -1.345
SE 0.672 0.260
Total 0.000 0.000
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Table 12. Channels: Environmental social norms and policy stringency.
The table reports estimation results of Equation (3) of 5-day cumulative abnormal returns
on Sustainalytics sample. In Panel A, specification 1 (2) refers to countries with low (high)
environmental social norms. Similarly, in Panel B specification 1 (2) refers to countries with
low (high) environmental policy stringency. All specifications includes firm controls, sector
and country fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate that the parameter estimate is significantly
different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. t-statistics based on robust
standard errors are shown in parentheses.
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: 5-day CAR 5-day CAR
Panel A: Environmental social norms
Low High
Carbon intensity (firm) -0.328*** -0.164
(-3.773) (-1.151)
Observations 680 768
R-squared 0.089 0.059
Panel B: Environmental policy stringency
Low High
Carbon intensity (firm) -0.239*** -0.165
(-3.211) (-1.075)
Observations 712 803
R-squared 0.062 0.060
Firm controls Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes
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Table 13. Carbon intensity and the Greta Thunberg effect.
The table reports estimation results of Equation (3) of daily CAPM-adjusted returns from
March 20, 2019 to June 30, 2019 (69 trading days) on the interaction between the firm-level
carbon intensity from Sustainalytics and the Google search value index (SVI) for the topics
“Greta Thunberg” (SVI Greta), and on the direct effects of both variables. Specification
1 uses the SVI at country-level, while specification 2 uses the SVI at global level. The
regressions also control for firm characteristics (size, leverage, and profitability) and sector
fixed effects. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***,
**, and * indicate that the parameter estimate is significantly different from zero at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: AR AR
Carbon intensity (firm) × SVI Greta (country) -0.001***
(-3.367)
Carbon intensity (firm) × SVI Greta (global) -0.003***
(-4.535)
Carbon intensity (firm) 0.001 0.022**
(0.232) (2.542)
SVI Greta (country) 0.005***
(6.317)
SVI Greta (global) -0.044***
(-6.649)
Observations 102,751 102,751
R-squared 0.001 0.001
Firm controls Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes
Day FE Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes
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Figure 5. Distribution of Carbon intensity (country-industry) by countries, Eu-
rostat sample.
Panel A shows the distributions of carbon intensity (country-industry) for each country with
at least 1% of companies in the sample. In order to highlight the heterogeneity between
data, Panel B shows the distributions focusing on a limited scale (from 0 to 1) of carbon
intensity.
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Figure 6. Distribution of carbon intensity (country-industry) by sectors, Euro-
stat sample.
Panel A shows the distributions of carbon intensity (country-industry) for each GICS sec-
tor. In order to highlight the heterogeneity between data, Panel B shows the distributions
focusing on a limited scale (from 0 to 1) of carbon intensity.
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Supplementary Appendix
Table A1. List of major stock exchanges.
The table provides the list of Stock Exchanges in which the stocks in our samples are listed.
Stock Exchange Country Country
London United Kingdom GB
NYSE Euronext Paris France
FR
Paris France
Frankfurt Germany
DE
IBIS Germany
Warsaw Poland PL
Stockholm Sweden SE
Milan Italy IT
Zurich Switzerland
CH
SWX Swiss Exchange Switzerland
Madrid Spain ES
Athens Greece GR
Helsinki Finland FI
Copenhagen Denmark DK
Oslo Norway NO
Luxembourg City Luxembourg LU
NYSE Euronext Amsterdam Netherlands NL
NYSE Euronext Brussels Belgium BE
Vienna Austria AT
Bucharest Romania RO
Irish Ireland IE
Lisbon Portugal PT
Budapest Hungary HU
Sofia Bulgaria BG
Vilnius Lithuania LT
Tallinn Estonia EE
Nicosia Cyprus CY
Prague Czech Republic CZ
Ljubljana Slovenia SI
Riga Latvia LV
Bratislava Slovakia SK
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Table A2. Distribution of the number of observations available for each company.
The table reports the percentage number of stocks with respect to the their buckets of number
of daily observations in 2018.
Number of daily obs. Frequency
127 ≤ 140 1.73%
141 ≤ 170 2.93%
171 ≤ 200 5.79%
201 ≤ 230 10.53%
231 ≤ 258 79.02%
Figure A1. Placebo test: Stock-market carbon price in January 2019.
The figure shows the evolution of regression estimates of the effect of Carbon intensity (firm)
on CAPM-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns from January 2 through January 31, 2019,
controlling for sector and firm characteristics. The cumulation of returns starts on January
2, 2019 (day -51). The graph also plots the 95% confidence intervals around estimates.
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